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Recent Cases
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SPECIAL LEGISLATION-
PAYMENT OF PERSONAL PROPERTY TAXES
House Bill 346,1 enacted by the 1954 session of the General
Assembly of Kentucky, provided that before a resident of Ken-
tucky could be issued a motor vehicle registration receipt or
license plate he had to submit evidence to the county court clerk
that he had paid his personal property taxes, due to the state,
county and city. Carriers of persons for hire operating vehicles
designed to carry more than nine persons were excluded from
the coverage of the act.2 The appellant asserted the unconstitu-
tionality of the act for the reason that it was special legislation
prohibited by Section 59 of the Kentucky Constitution. The ap-
pellee contended, inter alia, that the law involved a valid exercise
of the state's police power to regulate the use of its highways by
motor vehicles. The judgment of the lower court upheld the
validity of the statute. The Court of Appeals reversed that judg-
ment, holding that the act was invalid special legislation, within
the prohibition of Section 59 of the Constitution, because of the
distinction made between kinds of motor vehicles. Schoo v. Rose,
270 S.W. 2d 940 (Ky. 1954).
This case involves a rather unusual application of the "special
legislation" concept to a revenue measure designed to aid in the
collection of personal property taxes. The Court of Appeals con-
cluded that omission from the coverage of the act of owners of
motor vehicles designed to carry more than nine persons amounted
to "special legislation." The reasoning used by the court to reach
this decision was at least questionable.
The court, however, correctly rejected the appellee's conten-
tion that the 1954 act in question should be upheld as a valid
"This bill was codified as Ky. REv. STAT. sees. 186.275-186.285.
'The scope of the application of the Act is defined in section 1, subsection ( 1)
thereof to include all Kentucky residents who are required to register a motor
vehicle pursuant to Ky. REV. STAT. see. 186.060. These latter sections provide for
the registration and licensing by county court clerks of certain motor vehicles
except motor vehicles operating under certificates of convenience and necessity.
Such excepted vehicles are required to be licensed by the Department of Motor
Transportation and certificates for them are issued under the provisions of Chap-
ter 281 of Ky. REv. STAT.
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exercise of the police power, recognizing that a legislative enact-
ment can be sustained as an exercise of police power only if it has
some reasonable relation to such objects as public safety, health,
peace, good order or morals. The court stated that:
Making the right to operate an automobile upon the public
highways of the State dependent upon whether a person
has paid his personal property taxes upon property other
than the vehicle to be licensed seems to us to have no rela-
tion to any of the subjects to which the police power ex-
tends. Rather it seems clear that the act is purely and
simply a revenue measure, adjunctive to enforcing the col-
lection of taxes on personal property.3
After determining that the law in question in the Schoo case
was a revenue measure, the court considered its validity under
the constitutional prohibition against "special legislation."4 Rec-
ognition was given to the accepted general statements of rules
which attempt to define what is meant by special legislation.' In
spite of the agreement of the courts of various jurisdictions on the
general statements, these rules are difficult to apply in the numer-
ous and varied fact situations in which laws have been attacked
as "special."
' 270 S.W. 2d 940, 941-942 (Ky. 1954).
'Section 59 of the KENTucKY CoNsTrruroN provides that the General Assem-
bly shall not pass any local or special acts concerning twenty-eight specifically
named subjects and concludes with an inclusive provision in subsection 29 that:
"In all other cases where a general law can be made applicable no special law
shall be enacted." The constitutions of almost all of the states contain some limita-
tion on the power of the legislatures to enact special or local laws. See Anderson,
Special and Local Acts In Arkansas, 3 Ana. L. REv. 113 (1949); Cloe and Marcus,
Special and Local Legislation, 24 Ky. L.J. 349 (1936); 51 YALE LJ. 1358 (1942).
" In the prncipal case the court, to support the general rules with regard to
"special legislation," referred to citations dealing with situations involving due
process of law and protection of the laws guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.
270 S.W. 2d 940, 941. While the statement of general rules with regard to these
rights protected by the Federal Constitution are either identical with or almost
identical with those applied to special legislation, the concepts are not identical.
It has been pointed out that there are many statutes which will fall under the
provisions prohibiting special and local legislation which will be upheld under the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution because the Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection clause requires only that there be "equality" of and
not "identity" of treatment (as is required by the special legislation provisions) of
all those persons or things in a particular class, assuming that the classification is
reasonable. On the other hand, a person attacking a law under the Fourteenth
Amendment must show not only an unreasonable classification but also an injury
resulting therefrom. Under a provision prohibiting special legislation one need
only show that the law affecting him is based upon an unreasonable classification.
Cloe and Marcus, supra note 4 at 354. See also, 51 YALE L.J., supra note 4 at 1360,
where it is stated that: "More general restrictions on all types of repressive special
legislation are embodied in the due process clause and the concept of separation
of powers."
' Two writers on the subject of special legislation have concluded that "special
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As a general rule courts recognize that an act will meet the
constitutional requirements of general legislation, and will not be
condemned as "special," if its operation is uniform upon a class
of persons, places or things prescribed by or affected by the act.
7
It is also necessary that the classification must be "reasonable"
and germane to the purpose of the statute. The Court of Appeals,
in the instant case, stated the often-repeated rule that ".... there
must be distinctive and natural reasons inducing and supporting
the classification."9 It is sometimes said that classification must
be based upon some reasonable and substantial difference in kind,
situation or circumstance bearing a proper relation to the purpose
of the statute.10
The court seemed to consider that the principal question in
the instant case was whether the classification in the legislative
enactment, by which the law was made applicable to one class
of motor vehicle owners and not to another, was reasonable. The
court recognized that motor vehicles have been separately classi-
fied for legislative purposes other than those relating to collection
of revenue, 1 stating that other separate classifications could be
legislation is that legislation which the court calls Special." Horack, Special Legis-
lation: Another Twilight Zone, 12 IND. L.J. 109, 123 (1936). Cloe and Marcus,
supra note 4 at 376, have stated that principles "appear to be no more than
bolstering statements; they are used when in accord with the court's conclusion
and otherwise ignored."
"Commonwealth v. Griffen, 268 Ky. 830, 105 S.W. 2d 1063, 1065 (1937);
King v. Com., 194 Ky. 143, 238 S.W. 373, 376, 22 A.L.R. 535 (1922); 50 Am.
Jim. 17-21 (1944); 12 Am L. 11EV. 419, 421 (1941); Anderson, supra note 4, at
118; 2 KYaN. L. REv. 75, 76 (1953).
'Commonwealth v. Griffen, supra note 7; Com. v. Kentucky Jockey Club, 238
Ky. 739, 38 S.W. 2d 987, 994 (1931); 50 Am. Jim. 20-21, 28-24 (1944); Com-
ment, 2 KAN. L. REv., supra note 6; Cloe and Marcus, supra note 4 at 364.
p270 S.W. 2d 940, 941.
1050 Am. Jim. 24 (1944). See also supra note 8.
"Chapter 281 of KENTUCY REvisE STATUTES deals with contract motor car-
riers, common carriers and motor carriers operating under certificates of public con-
venience and necessity and imposes various kinds of restrictions with regard to
such vehicles that are not imposed with regard to ordinary passenger automobiles.
Additional fees or taxes are prescribed with regard to the motor vehicles dealt
with in this chapter that are not imposed with regard to ordinary automobiles.
Ky. REv. STAT. sec. 281.615 provides that no person shall act as a motor car-
rier without first having obtained a certificate or permit from the Department of
Motor Transportation, Ky. REv. STAT. sec. 281.620 imposes a $25 filing fee on
applicants for a certificate or permit or for amendment or transfer or sale or change
in route or abandonment of a certificate or permit as a condition precedent to the
granting of the thing applied for. Ky. REv. STAT. sec. 281.655 prescribes that
before any certificate or permit will be issued or renewed, the applicant or holder
of the certificate or permit must file or have on fie with the Department of Motor
Transportation an approved indemnifying bond or insurance policy, and the types
and amounts of insurance to be carried on each vehicle are prescribed according
to passenger capacity and gross weight. Ky. RBv. STAT. sec. 281.811 imposes a tax,
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sustained as a valid exercise of the police power, but concluded
that there was no reasonable basis tax-wise for the distinction be-
tween large carriers of persons, including various kinds of busses
and other classes of vehicles, and small carriers. The Court of
Appeals observed that owners of both classes of vehicles were re-
quired to pay a license tax as a condition precedent to their rights
to use the highways, and that both are required to pay taxes upon
other personal property and are liable to the same penalties for
nonpayment, and concluded that the only substantial difference
between the two groups is that the license tax is paid through
different agencies. In conclusion the court stated: "We do not
think that single difference is sufficient to support a classification
by which the act is applicable to one class and inapplicable to the
other."'2
The purposes for which prohibitions against special legislation
were added to state constitutions and the cases in which such
provisions have been applied seem to give the best indication as
to what situations really involve the concept of invalid special
legislation and indicate that the court misapplied that concept in
the instant case. The constitutional purposes and cases suggest
(1) that the "special legislation" doctrine was not intended to
prohibit a revenue collection measure based upon a reasonable
classification of the things or objects on which it was designed
on every motor carrier operating wreckers, of $10 per year per wrecker. Various
other statutory provisions contained in Chapter 281 dealing with taxes and tax col-
ection are as follows: sec. 281.812-yearly seat tax on airport limousines; sec.
281.813-weight tax on U-Drive-It vehicles used in the transportation of property;
sec. 281.815-mileage and seat tax on motor vehicles engaged in transporting
passengers for hire, and license fees for certain other commercial vehicles; sec.
281.750-identification required of motor vehicles for proper identification and for
prevention of tax evasion; sec. 281.755-inspection of motor vehicles; sec. 218.810-
weight tax on motor vehicles primarily engaged in the transportation of property
for hire, license fee for driveaways. In addition to the statutory provisions just
mentioned there are others requiring various reports and inspections with regard
to certain vehicles that enable the state government to keep a close check on
them. The fact that motor vehicles have been separately classified for tax purposes
is illustrated by Ky. Ev. STATS. sec. 138.470 which expressly exempts from the 3%
usage tax, imposed on motor vehicles by Ky. !REv. STAT. sec. 138.460, motor
vehicles of a common carrier or contract carrier upon which the tax imposed by
Ky. REv. STAT. sec. 281.810 (imposing a weight tax) or sec. 281.815 (imposing a
mileage and seat tax) and a franchise tax is paid by the owner.
270 S.W. 2d 940, 942. The appellee's contention that the operation of a
motor vehicle upon the public highways is not a right but a privilege that might
be conferred or denied at the will of the Legislature was disposed of by the court's
saying that such conditions and regulations imposed must be general and uniform
in their operation.
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to operate, and (2) that the statutory classification involved in the
Schoo case was not unreasonable.
The origin of state constitutional provisions prohibiting the
enactment of "special", 'local' or "private" acts can be traced to
abuses of political power by special interest groups.'3 The various
states adopted such constitutional provisions in order to prevent
piecemeal legislation and to secure uniformity of the laws as ap-
plied to geographical areas and to all persons of the same class.'
4
The terms "special" and "locar' appear to be used synonymously
in many of the cases, but when properly applied, "speciar' relates
to persons or things and "locar' relates to political or geographal
units.' There was also a desire on the part of framers of constitu-
tional provisions to prevent a waste of time spent on trivial mat-
ters by the legislatures, and to prevent their concern with such a
large volume of laws that proper consideration could not be given
to them. 6
Authoritative precedents supporting the decision in the in-
stant case are lacking. None of the cases cited by the Court of
Appeals to support its decision involve a factual situation similar
to that in the Schoo case. Some of the cited cases deal with
validity of classification of subjects of legislation under the "equal
protection" clause of the Federal Constitution, and the citation
to American Jurisprudence used by the court deals with "equal
protection" of the laws and not with the special legislation con-
cept.'7 The use of these citations, instead of those dealing with
special legislation cases, probably did not change what would
have been the court's decision. Although a classification could be
held good under the "equal protection" clause that might be in-
valid when applied to a "special legislation" provision in a state
constitution," the same, or substantially the same, definitions for
2 KAN. L. REv., supra note 7 at 75.
"Markendorf v. Friedman, 280 Ky. 484, 133 S.W. 2d 517 at 519, 127 A.L.R.
416 (1939); Cloe and Marcus, supra note 4 at 357-358. See also Clay v. Saunders,
52 N.Y.S. 2d 837, 184 Misc. 143 (1945), setting out purposes of special legis-
lation provisions.
sCloe and Marcus, supra note 4 at 364-365; Anderson, supra note 4 at 113.
Kentucky cases that set out distinctions between "special" and "local" laws are
Shaw v. Fox, 246 Ky. 342, 55 S.W. 2d 11 (1932), King v. Com., 194 Ky. 143,
238 S.W. 373, 22 A.'L.R. 535 (1922) and Greene v. Caldwell, 170 Ky. 571, 186
S.W. 648 (1916).
"Horack and Welsh, supra note 6 at 193.
"12 Am. Jun. 156 (1944).
"Supra note 5.
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purposes of reasonable classification of subjects of legislation are
used in both "equal protection" and "special legislation" cases.
"Equal protection" is a broader concept than "special legislation."
Only one case was referred to in the opinion of the Schoo case
that involved a fact situation in which a litigant asserted the in-
validity of a statute making the right to receive a motor vehicle
license dependent upon a showing of payment of personal prop-
erty taxes, on the ground that such a statute was "special legisla-
tion." That case, State ex rel. Taylor v. Mirabel,"9 relied on by
the appellee to support his contention that the Kentucky statute
was constitutional, was said to be "clearly not in point." The
court distinguished this case from the Schoo case by pointing out
that the act in the New Mexico case did not relate to personal
property other than the vehicle to be licensed and applied to the
owners of all motor vehicles alike.20
Cases in jurisdictions other than New Mexico have sustained
the validity of statutes similar to the Kentucky and New Mexico
statutes requiring as a condition precedent to the issuance of a
license for the operation of a motor vehicle either the payment
of all personal property taxes or only those on the vehicle to be
licensed. " In Grossfeld v. Baughman,22 a Maryland case, a statute
was upheld which required all taxes due and in arrears on motor
vehicles to be paid before any plate or certificate of registration
of title for such a vehicle could be issued or transferred. This act
specifically excepted from its application "commercial trucks,"
and thus was very much like the Kentucky act involved in Schoo
v. Rose. In the Grossfeld case the contentions that the act violated
the "due process" and "equal protection" provisions of the Con-
stitution and that it was a invalid special law were rejected. The
court stated:
On precedent and principle, the provisions of the statute in
question are not open to any constitutional objection. The
classification of motor vehicles into two great natural di-
Th33 N.M. 553, 273 P. 928, 62 A.L.R. 296 (1928).
The main objection to the constitutionality of the New Mexico act, aside
from the question relating to the title of the act, was predicted upon an alleged
discrimination between the payers of personal property taxes as to the dates when
their taxes should be paid.
" See Annotation in 62 A.L.R. 304 (1928), following State ex rel. Taylor v.
Mirabel.
"148 Md. 330, 129 Atl. 370 (1925).
KENTucKy LAw Jomu-NA
visions is not unreasonable, and the penalties imposed for
the failure to pay the taxes on the designated class of non-
commercial motor vehicles cannot be said to be so arbitrary
or unfair as to fall under the condemnation of law.
23
The further observation was made that the act affected all of a
distinct class within a defined territorial unit and did not apply
to those outside the boundary of Baltimore City.24 Other cases
involving the same problem and in which statutes similar to that
in the principal case were upheld, despite challenges that such
statutes denied equal protection of the laws to persons of the same
class and were discriminatory, are Mayor and City Council of
Baltimore v. Perrin2W 5 and Hammett v. Kansas City.
2
Prior to the decision by the Court of Appeals in the principal
case, the "special legislation" provision of the Kentucky Constitu-
tion has never been applied to invalidate a law in a factual situa-
tion similar to that involved in the Schoo case. The special legis-
lation section was once used to strike down an act relating to the
registration and taxation of motor vehicles, because the procedure
for collection was made different in counties having a city of the
first class from that in counties not having such a city. Many
13Id. 129 AtI. 373.
'4Id. at 874.
12 A. 2d 261 (Md. 1940). In this case it was contended on constitutional
grounds that the requirement of payment of taxes on all personal property of
former owners, including those on vehicles, deprived the present owners of
property without due process of law. The court concluded that the act could not
be objected to as discriminatory on the ground that city officials assessed taxes on
vehicles owned by individuals separate from those on their other personalty and
received payment of taxes on them separately and that they did not follow that
practice with respect to taxes of corporation.
173 S.W. 2d 70 (Mo. 1948), wherein a city ordinance prohibiting issuance
of a license to anyone failing to pay city personal property tax for preceding year,
as a plied to motor vehicle owners did not violate the "equal protection" clause
of te Fourteenth Amendment, nor the state constitutional provisions giving all
persons the natural right to enjoyment of the gains of their own industry. The
contention was rejected that the statute in question denied equal protection to
certain taxpayer licensees in that it made their duties more onerous and burden-
some than those of taxpayers who were not such licensees.
' Nuetzel v. State Tax Commission, 205 Ky. 124, 265 S.W. 606 (1924). See
also: Hager v. Walker, 128 Ky. 1, 107 S.W. 254 (1908), in which revenue meas-
ures were held to be special legislation; Commonwealth v. E. H. Taylor Jr., Co.,
101 Ky. 325, 38 S.W. 10 (1897), in which a statute was declared invalid special
legislation requiring taxation of the property in the possession of and owned by
one who owed taxes thereon to the United States in a different manner or mode
from that required on the same kind of property in the hands of and owned by
those citizens who had paid taxes to the United States. In the Hager case a license
tax on real estate agents was declared invalid special legislation because the
amount of the tax imposed was of different amounts, dependent upon what class
of city an agent lived in.
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other cases deal with the reasonableness of a classification in-
volving population differences of certain areas. Other Kentucky
cases upholding legislation challenged as special and as not set-
ting up a reasonable classification for the subjects of the act deal
with a wide variety of subjects and classifications ranging from
cases in which laws were applied to certain illegal businesses,
28
to cases dealing with salaries of judges and commissioners of the
Court of Appeals,29 and a case in which a distinction was made
between drugstores employing regular pharmacists and those not
employing such pharmacists. 0
It might have been contended that making the right to receive
a motor vehicle license plate or registration receipt dependent
upon whether or not a vehicle owner can show evidence that he
has paid his personal property taxes discriminates between those
who own and those who do not own motor vehicles, and thus
discriminates in the enforcement of the personal property tax.
This same discrimination might also support an argument that
there is a violation of the guaranty of equal protection of the laws,
or of the constitutional provision requiring that all taxes must be
levied and collected by general laws, or of the requirement that
taxes must be uniform. Nevertheless, the "equal protection"
clause of the Constitution does not prohibit a reasonable classifica-
" Commonwealth v. Kentucky Jockey Club, 238 Ky. 739, 38 S.W. 2d 987
(1931) (in which a statute creating the offense of gaming and providing that it
should not include pari mutuel system of betting on horse races within inclosures
while races were being run was held not to be forbidden by See. 59 of the Con-
stitution of Kentucky, prohibiting the passage of local or special acts); King v.
Com., 194 Ky. 143, 238 S.W. 373 (1922) (in which a law for abatement of dis-
orderly houses was held not to violate the constitutional provision against special
or local legislation).
IManning v. Sims, 308 Ky. 587, 213 S.W. 2d 577 (1948) (in which it was
contended that the act in question was special and local in its application to judges
and exempted them from the provisions of the general law relating to expense
accounts).
Markendorf v. Friedman, 280 Ky. 484, 133 S.W. 2d 517, 127 A.L.R. 416,
appeal dismissed in 309 U.S. 627, 60 S. Ct. 610 (1939). This case upheld a
classification of drug stores as reasonable for purposes of public health. Two ad-
ditional cases illustrating other fact situations in which statutes were upheld
despite charges that they amounted to special legislation are Galloway v. City of
Winchester, 299 Ky. 87, 184 S.W. 2d 890 (1944) and Com. ex rel. v. Griffin, supra
note 7. In the first of these cases a statute prohibiting maintenance of an action
against a city for personal injuries caused by a defect in a street unless timely
notice was given to city officials was held constitutional and not objectionable as
class legislation or special legislation by fixing a period of limitation different from
the period within which one may sue other tort-feasors. The Griffin case upheld
the portion of a statute relieving incumbent members of boards of education from
the necessity of meeting new educational qualifications.
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tion, and equal protection is afforded if all of the same class are
treated alike. Thus it might be said that motor vehicle owners
of the type to which the act applies are treated alike (assuming a
reasonable classification as a class), and that if the classification
involved in this case is reasonable for purposes of the special legis-
lation prohibition, it is reasonable for purposes of the equal pro-
tection provision. With regard to the question of whether the
collection of taxes in this way violates the "uniformity of taxation"
concept, it has been recognized that only the levy or assessment
of the tax must be uniform and not its means of enforcement.3'
In the case of Hammett v. Kansas City32 the court quotes from
Florida Central and P. R. Co. v. Reynolds as follows:
If taxes are to be regarded as mere debts then the effort of the
state to collect from one debtor is not prejudiced by its
failure to make like effort to collect from another. And if
regarded in the truer light as a contribution to the support
of government, then it does not lie in the mouth of one
called upon to make his contribution to complain that some
other person has not been coerced into a like contribution.
33
As a matter of fact, the procedures for collection of taxes on com-
mon carriers are far more stringent that those in the instant
statute.34
In summary, it can be observed that several reasons suggest
that the court wrongly concluded that the act in question in the
principal case was special legislation, namely: (1) case law
authority (in Kentucky and other jurisdictions as well); (2) the
purpose of the law, which was to collect personal property taxes;
(8) the history of special legislation sections of state constitutions,
indicating that a revenue collection measure distinguishing be-
tween kinds or classes of motor vehicles was not the type of legis-
lative action that such sections were designed to prevent; and (4)
the fact that types of motor vehicles have been separately clas-
sified for other purposes, with common carriers and other large
vehicles being subjected to many restrictions.
= Supra note 22, 129 AUt. at 373.
"Supra note 26.
S183 U.S. 471, 480 (1902).
U Ky. RFv. STAT. sees. 281.811, 281.812, 281.813, 281.815, 281.750, 281.810.
See supra note 11, citing these sections and referring to the particular taxes in-
volved.
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In conclusion, it is suggested that this decision will not be
greatly acclaimed by honest taxpayers who are actually paying
taxes on their automobiles and on other personal property, well-
knowing that other property owners are failing to submit a listing
of personal property for tax purposes.
P. JoAN SKAGGS
SURETYSHIP-REIMBURSEMENT-SUBROGATION-
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
A surety made payment in 1948 on a contractor's bond to a
materialman without taking a written assignment of the creditor's
claim against the contractor. Seven years later, the surety sought
reimbursement by the contractor, or, as an alternative, subrogation
to the rights of the materialman under the construction contract
between the contractor and the City of Ashland. The contractor
pleaded the five-year statute of limitations for implied contracts
as a bar to the surety's action. The trial court sustained a demur-
rer to the contractor's plea and entered judgment for the surety.
Held: Reversed. Where a surety pays a debt of the principal
debtor and seven years later sues the principal debtor for reim-
bursement, the action based on the implied contract for reim-
bursement is barred by Kentucky Revised Statutes section 413.120,
which provides that an action upon a contract not in writing,
express or implied, must be commenced within five years from
the time the action accrued. Nor can the surety recover through
the application of the doctrine of subrogation, for subrogation is
an "incident" to the right of reimbursement and is also barred by
section 413.120. Payne v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 259 S.W. 2d
491 (Ky. 1953).
It is widely accepted that a surety may secure reimbursement
by the principal debtor for any amount of money which he has
paid against the debt.' At early common law, the right of a surety
to be reimbursed was denied in the absence of an express promise
to indemnify,2 but it is now held that the principal debtor im-
pliedly promises to reimburse the surety for that which he has
'HANNA, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SEcunIrY 357, note 1 (1952).
See Appleton v. Bascom, 3 Metc. 169 (Mass. 1841). See also, SnPsoN,
Sun-rysin 225 (1950).
